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Central bank Transparency and Information Dissemination: An
experimental Approach
Emna Trabelsi∗and Walid Hichri†
December 2, 2013
Abstract
In this paper, we propose to compare different partial transparency regimes in order to determine the
optimal diessmination policy by the central bank, using an experimental approach. A treatment dedicated
to the benchmark situation (where information is fully released) is also available. Our experiment is based
on subsequent framework of Morris and Shin (2002), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012).
The predictive power of K-level reasoning is an issue that is addressed also in this paper. Our experiment
indicates that -when fully disclosed- players overreact to public information and this overreaction is efficiently
reduced when the degree of publicity decreases (i.e. when the fragmentation measure increases). The average
weight assigned to common signal decreases over treatments, especially when we establish partial transparent
strategy (i.e. fragmented information). The results provide support both for and against global games
theoretical predictions. In fact, although players overreact to public signal, their behavior is inconsistent with
theoretical equilibrium, which means that the destabilizing effect of public information is less pronounced
experimentally than when it does in theory. This is not the case when public information is fragmented;
subjects’ behavior does approach equilibrium. These observations coincide with both a collective and an
individual analyses of behavior.
JEL classification: E58, D82, C93
Keywords: Central bank transparency, coordination games, semi-public information, private information,
experimental economics
1 Introduction
Central bank communication is an important aspect in implementing an efficient and effective monetary policy
stance. Central banks have focused on greater transparency by enlarging the modes of communication.
Central banks make use of a wide range of communication tools, whose objective is to help private agents to
understand the contribution that monetary policy is intended to make to economic and price developments over
time and helps to anticipate the broad direction of the monetary policy over the medium term. This guidance
reinforces the predictability of policy statements and affects expectations regarding the future path of interest
rates, thereby making the policy more effective. Although it is widely accepted that improved transparency of
monetary policy and the associated communication have been effective (Trabelsi and Ayadi, 2011), the question
remains if a central bank should reveal more information to the public, thereby making its communication more
explicit and forward looking.
The issue of central bank transparency has been discussed in several aspects1. This paper relates specifically
to the approach taken in coordination games. This strand of literature supports that communication may in
certain circumstances, be undesirable and counterproductive (Morris and Shin (2002), Amato et al. (2002) and
Padoa-Schioppa (2004)).
∗Corresponding Author. Institut Supérieur de Gestion de Tunis (ISG Tunis). 41 Avenue de la Liberté, cité Bouchoucha, le
Bardo, 2000. Tunisia. E-mail: emna.trabelsi2007@yahoo.fr. Mobile: 00216 21 310 931.
†Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne, Ecully, F-69130, France, Université Lyon
2, Lyon, F-69007, France & Laboratoire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative du Développement (LAREQUAD). E-mail:
hichri@gate.cnrs.fr.
1See Blinder et al. (2008) for an overview of theory.
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There are obviously limits to how information can be digested effectively (Gai and Shin, 2003). The central
bank must be careful to communicate issues on which it may receive noisy signals itself2. This issue has been
remarkably highlighted by Morris and Shin (2002) in a beauty contest game. Those authors notice that a noisy
public signal can lead to greater variability and reduces social welfare when economic agents discard private
information in coordinating their actions. Amato, Morris and Shin (2002) argue that communication plays a
dual role: on one hand, it provides signals about the private information of the central bank and on the other
hand, it serves as a mechanism for coordinating economic agents expectations. They note that the communication
can reduce social welfare if agents give more weight to these communications (used as a focal point) and too
little on their own information. The central bank can thus coordinate actions away from fundamentals. The
result of Morris and Shin (2002) has generated numerous responses and comments, so that Svensson (2006)
questioned its plausibility in the sense that the argument advanced by Morris and Shin does not remain in
reality. Additionally, Woodford (2003, 2005) notes that the problem of Morris and Shin (2002) is even less likely
to arise if the coordination of private agents is a goal of welfare per se. Amador and Weil (2006) argue that
additional public information can create confusion among economic agents, slows the dissemination of private
information and can reduce social welfare. However, Angeletos and Pavan (2004, 2007) show that the impact of
public information depends on the degree of strategic complementarities.
Most of these theoretical studies on informational structure involve accuracy and information nature (pub-
lic/private). Recently, we focus on the number of receivers as an important component of information and the
number of information (i.e Morris and Shin (2007), Cornand and Heinemann (2008)).
In the same context as that of Morris and Shin, Cornand and Heinemann (2008), argue that welfare improves
when more public information is only received by a fraction of market participants. According to these authors,
limiting publicity of information can reduce the negative externalities associated with high level of transparency.
Indeed, public information must be provided with maximum precision, but is not transmitted to all agents. A
restriction on the degree of publicity of information will be more effective in avoiding adverse effects from the
public announcement than a restriction on the information accuracy.
The key insight in the analysis of Morris and Shin (2002) is that equilibrium players often place too much
weight on public signal relative to that would be used by the social planner. Therefore, individual information
is not socially efficient and enhanced public disclosure could hurt social welfare. The generelized framework
that we use is a modification of Morris and Shin (2002), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012),
respectively. In our setting, just as in the benchmark model, the agents’ payoff is determined by two criteria:
How well an agent’s action matches an unknown state of the world and how well his action matches the average
action of other agents. We address in this paper different issues. First, it theoretically analyses the effectiveness
of fragmented strategy in reducing the overreaction to public information. Second, it empirically tests the
theoretical predictions in a laboratory experiment. Third, we draw some policy guidelines regarding strategies
to disclose information to the public. We design several experimental treatments that differ from each other
in the number of receivers and or the number of information. Although a brief overview of theoretical findings
is provided below, this paper focuses particularly on experimental evidence. The reminder of this paper is as
follows, section 2 describes our basic model and the theoretical predictions of Trabelsi (2012); section 3 presents
the experimental design, our main results will be discussed in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2 Basics of the theoretical model: Modified model of Morris and Shin
and its variants
This section provides a theoretical background for our study. First, based on the Morris and Shin (2007) and on
Trabelsi (2012) models, subsequently, we develop the framework that will be used in our experimental design.
Then, within this framework, we derive our main results.
There are N identical agents, j = 1, 2...N . Agent j chooses an action aij . The payoff function of agent j is
given by:
U
(
aij , a¯−j , θ
)
= u0 − (1− r)
(
aij − θ
)2
− r
(
aij − a¯−j
)2
(1)
2For example, forecasts errors....
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Where u0 is a constant, θ represents the fundamental state. r is the degree of strategic complementarities
and it is a constant between 0 and 1. a¯−j =
1
N−1
∑
k 6=j
ak is the average action of j’s opponents.
The payoff function has three terms. The first one is a constant u0 and is the highest payoff the individual
can possibly earn. The second term reflects the loss from mismatching the underlying fundamental θ and aij .
The third term is the “beauty contest” term. It measures the loss from mismatching the average actions of
opponents a¯−j . The parameter r measures the relative importance of coordinating with opponents’ actions
versus matching the underlying state. When u0 = 0, the game becomes the coordination game specified in
Morris and Shin (2002). When r = 1, the game becomes similar to the beauty contest in the sense that subjects
only need to match the average of the other players’ actions.
The payoff function differs from Morris and Shin (2002) in three ways3 : First, we consider a setting with a
finite number of players, while in Morris and Shin (2002, 2007), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi
(2012) include a continuum of players. Second, the payoff function of Morris and Shin is always negative, which
is difficult to implement in laboratory. By adding a positive term to the original function, we allow participants’
payoffs to be positive without altering equilibrium predictions. Third, the distribution of the errors is uniform
instead of normal.
Briefly, we characterize the equilibrium with respect to the informational structure in Cornand and Heine-
mann (2008), in which the public signal y = θ + η is released to a fraction P of the population. Each agent has
his private signal xj = θ + εj .
Both η and ε are i.i.d normally distributed with zero mean and variances σ2η and σ
2
ε .
The optimal action of an agent j according to whether he receives a public signal or not is as follows:
aj =


σ2ε
σ2ε+(1−rP )σ
2
η
y +
(1−rP )σ2η
σ2ε+(1−rP )σ
2
η
xj j ∈ [0, P ]
xj j ∈ [P, 1]
As in Trabelsi (2012), before taking actions, agent j will receive two types of signals about θ and we assume
that both signals have the same precision α. The first signal is semi-public and is given by:
zi = θ + ηi i = 1, 2, ...n (2)
As for the second type of signals xij , it is private, which means that it is specific to each agent:
xij = θ + ε
i
j (3)
Both ηi and ε
i
j are i.i.d normally distributed with zero mean and variances σ
2
η and σ
2
ε .
Morris and Shin assume θ to have a uniform distribution over the real line in which case the expected value
of θ given zi and x
i
j is:
Eij (θ) =
σ2εzi + σ
2
ηx
i
j
σ2ε + σ
2
η
(4)
Following Trabelsi (2012) and using the Bayesian update rule, we can show that the unique equilibrium is
linear and is given by:
aij =
σ2εzi + σ
2
η
(
1− r
n
)
xij
σ2ε +
(
1− r
n
)
σ2η
(5)
Either by establishing a strategy of partial publicity or a fragmented information, the overeaction to public
information is reduced. We can summarize the effect of varying the publicity degree P and the fragmentation
measure n, respectively in this short Table:
3The utility function in the benchmark model of Morris and Shin (2002) is given by UMS (aj , θ) = u0 − (1− r) (aj − θ)
2 −
r
(
Lj − L¯
)
2where Lj =
´
1
0
(ak − θ)
2 dk and L¯ =
´
1
0
Lkdk. Since this function is complicated to be implemented in laboratoy, we
chose to use (1). As claimed by Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013), working with the utility function described in (1) has no incidence
on the theoretical optimal action given by the expression; aj = (1− r)Ej (θ) + rEj (a¯). consequently, it doesn’t alter the goals of
the paper.
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Table 1: Equivalence of effects between fragmentation and partial publicity
Then the weight on the semi-public signal
If P ↓ ↓
If n ↑ ↓
A major difficulty in implementing Morris and Shin set up in the lab is to generate θ using an improper
uniform distribution. To deal with this problem, we adopted the following strategy: we generate θ using the
uniform distribution on interval [a, b] and then given θ, we generated zi and x
i
j according to (2) and (3).
3 Experimental design matching theoretical model
3.1 Payoff function and signals
In all treatments, the payoff function of a subject j is given by:
U
(
aij , a¯−j , θ
)
= Max
(
0, u0 − (1− r)
(
aij − θ
)2
− r
(
aij − a¯−j
)2)
(6)
Where aij is the action of subject j, that belongs to group i, θ is the unknown true state of the world, a¯−j is
the average of all subjects’ actions except j and r is the relative importance of matching the weighted average
of the players’ actions.
Since the payoff function given by (6) is more complicated than those in typical laboratory experiments, every
effort was made to ensure that subjects understood the payoff structure. First, expression (6) was presented in
a simpler manner:
U
′ (
aij , a¯−j , θ
)
= 10× U
(
aij , a¯−j , θ
)
= Max
(
0, U0 − 10× (1− r)
(
aij − θ
)2
− 10× r
(
aij − a¯−j
)2)
(7)
The fact that payoffs could not be negative was explained to the subjects. Second, we took the advantage
of the fact that each term has a simple and an intuitive interpretation. We started by verbally explaining that
there are two factors that will determine the mismatching the underlying state and the mismatching the average
action made by others. After this was understood, we presented the actual mathematical form, explained the
meaning of each term, and went through several numerical examples. Finally, during the actual experiment at
the end of each period, the first and the second terms have been calculated and displayed together with θ and
a¯−j . This proved to be very helpful for participants since it highlighted how each term in (6) affects the payoff.
All treatments had a quite similar structure and differed only in two aspects: the degree of publicity and
fragmentation of the common information, respectively. The state and signals, whether they are public, semi-
public or private were generated prior to the experiment. For each period, θ is generated randomly according
to a uniform distribution on [50, 950]. Given θ, the signals are independently drawn from a uniform distribution
[θ− 10, θ+10]. Signal y is public and is the same for all participants. Signal zi is semi-public and it is the same
for all subjects who belong to the same sub-group i. Signal xij is private, that is specific to each player.
3.2 Treatment and session description
The experimental methodology followed in this paper is close to that of Cornand and Baierswyl (2013). Two
treatments A and B were implemented for this study. They differ with respect to information available to the
participants (For parameters and notations, see Table 2). Each treatment consists of three stages. We label
stage 1 of both treatments A and B as MS (referring to Morris and Shin), in which participants will receive 1
common signal and 1 private signal per subject. Stage 2 and 3 of treatment A are labelled as T (Referring to
Trabelsi), in which participants are divided in n sub-groups, each sub-group receives 1 common signal and 1
private signal per subject. Finally, stage 2 and 3 of treatment B are labelled as CH (referring to Cornand and
Heinemann), in which participants receive again one private signal per subject, but the common signal will be
disseminated to only a proportion P of the subjects (P=0.50 in stage 2 and P=0.25 in stage 3).
4
Sessions are based on the one of the two treatments and consist of three stages for a total of 45 periods, three
times 15 periods (per stage). The value of r is fixed for all the experiment (r=0.75)4. Within each stage, the
value of the fragmentation measure n is fixed. We used three values. In each session, we followed an ascending
order of the fragmentation measure n = 1, n = 2 and n = 4 . In the case of treatment B, we followed a
descending order of the degree of publicity P=1, P=0.50 and P=0.25 (for a detailed overview of treatments, see
Table 3).
Table 2: Parameters and notation
r(the coordination motive) 0.75
θ (the true state) [50, 950]
Precision of xj [θ − 10, θ + 10]
σ2ε 33.3333
Precision of y/zi [θ − 10, θ + 10]
σ2η 33.333
u0 40
N 8
P = m
N
Degree of publicity
n Fragmentation measure
MS Morris and Shin (2002): 1 public(common) signal + 1 pri-
vate signal/ per player
CH Partial publicity (Cornand and Heinemann (2008)): 1 pub-
lic signal to P players + 1 private signal per player
T Fragmentation : 1 common signal per 1/n of the 8 players
+ 1 private signal per player
The order of stages in both treatments is chosen as we want subjects to overreact first to public information
in the first place to analyse how much they adjust to communication strategies (either partial publicity or
fragmentation)5. Moreover, we had 8 subjects per group playing together allowing to deal with CH and T-
treatments, respectively6.
Table 3: Experiment parameters values
Sessions Groups Treatment Stages # Periods r ηi ε
i
j n P
1- MS 15 0.75 10 10 1
1-3 1-6 A 2- T1 15 0.75 10 10 2
3- T2 15 0.75 10 10 4
1- MS 15 0.75 10 10 1 (8)
4-6 7-12 B 2- CH1 15 0.75 10 10 0.5 (4)
3- CH2 15 0.75 10 10 0.25 (2)
Total of players 96=6*16
3.3 Adjustment of the theoretical models in the experimental setup
We present in what follows an adjustment of the theoretical setup so that the experiment will be based on those
theoretical models (Morris and Shin (2002), Cornand and Heinemann (2008) and Trabelsi (2012)) and we also
proceed to determine the expressions of the corresponding expected utility (or the gain) that we need later to
calculate the theoretical payoff (cf. Appendix D for fixed values used) and compare them whith those realized
in the experiment.
4In a previous experiment by Cornand and Heinemann (2013) measuring the overreaction for agents according to different values
of r, subjects tend to put larger weight on the public signal.
5We don’t need, then, to test for order treatments in this case.
6Examples of screen layout are available in appendix C.
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3.3.1 Private and public information: The case of Morris and Shin (2002)
In MS-treatment, subjects receive one public signal and a private signal that deviate from θ by some noise. Both
signals have a uniform distribution, such that y 7→ U [θ ± η] and xj 7→ U [θ ± ε].
The action of each subject j on equilibrium is given by :
aj =
ε
ε+ (1− r) η︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
y +
(1− r) η
ε+ (1− r) η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ
xj (8)
The average action accross all agents: a¯ =
ε
ε+ (1− r) η︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ¯
y +
(1− r) η
ε+ (1− r) η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ¯
x¯
Now we derive the expected utility for player j according to (8) (We assume x¯→ θ)
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = E
[
− (1− r) (aj − θ)
2
− r (aj − a¯−j)
2
]
(9)
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = E
[
− (1− r) (λ (θ + η) + (1− λ) (θ + ε)− θ)2 − r (λ (θ + η) + (1− λ) (θ + ε)− λ (θ + η)− (1− λ) θ)2
]
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = E
(
− (1− r)
(
λ2σ2η
)
+ (1− λ)
2
σ2ε − r (1− λ)
2
σ2ε
)
= − (1− r)λ2σ2η − (1− λ)
2
σ2ε
3.3.2 Private and P-common beliefs: The case of Cornand and Heinemann (2008)
In CH-treatment, subjects receive two types of signals on unknown value of θ that are uniformly distributed
such as in MS-treatment with the difference that y will be revealed to only a proportion P = m
N
of subjects. m
is the number of subjects who receive the common signal y and N is the total number of subjects.
The optimal action of each subject is given by:
aj =


ε
ε+
(
1− rm−1
N−1
)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
y +
(
1− rm−1
N−1
)
η
ε+
(
1− rm−1
N−1
)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ
xj j ∈ [1,m]
xj j ∈ [m+ 1, N ]
(10)
The average action across all subjects is given by :
a =
m
N
ε
ε+
(
1− rm−1
N−1
)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ¯
y +
N−m
N−1 ε+
(
1− rm−1
N−1
)
η
ε+
(
1− rm−1
N−1
)
η︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ¯
x¯
To determine the expression of the expected utility function for subjects who receive the public signal and
for those who only receive the private signal, we need to get the expression of a¯−j
a¯−j =


m− 1
N − 1
λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
λˆ
y +
(m− 1) (1− λ) + n−m
N − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λˆ
x¯ j ∈ [1,m]
m
N − 1
λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ˜
y +
m (1− λ) + n−m− 1
N − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ˜
x¯ j ∈ [m+ 1, N ]
(11)
The expected utility function for a subject who gets the public signal (We assume x¯→ θ):
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = E
[
− (1− r) (aj − θ)
2
− r (aj − a¯−j)
2
]
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = E
[
− (1− r) (λ (θ + η) + (1− λ) (θ + ε)− θ)2 − r
(
λ (θ + η) + (1− λ) (θ + ε)− λˆ (θ + η) +
(
1− λˆ
)
θ
)
2
]
E (Uj (aj , θ)) =
[
− (1− r)λ2 − r
(
λ− λˆ
)
2
]
σ2η − (1− λ)
2
σ2ε
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The expected utility function for a subject who only receives a private signal (We assume x¯→ θ):
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = E
[
− (1− r) (aj − θ)
2
− r (aj − a¯−j)
2
]
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = E
[
− (1− r) (θ + ε− θ)2 − r
(
θ + ε− λ˜ (θ + ε)−
(
1− λ˜
)
θ
)
2
]
E (Uj (aj , θ)) = −σ
2
ε − rλ˜
2σ2η
Aggregating overall subjects:
E (Uj (aj , θ)) =
(
−
m
N
(1− λ)2 − N−m
N
)
σ2ε +
(
−
m
N
(1− r)λ2 − m
N
r
(
λ− λˆ
)
2
−
N−m
N
λˆ2
)
σ2η
Note that when m = N , we get exactly the expected utility function of MS-treatment.
3.3.3 Private and semi-public information: The case of Trabelsi (2012)
In T-treatment, there are n semi-public information, observed each by N
n
subjects: zi 7→ U [θ ± ηi]. Each subject
j receives, in addition, his proper signal xij .
The optimal action at equilibrium is given by:
aij =
ε
ε+
(
1− r
N
n
−1
N−1
)
ηi︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
zi +
(
1− r
N
n
−1
N−1
)
ηi
ε+
(
1− r
N
n
−1
N−1
)
ηi︸ ︷︷ ︸
xij
1−λ
(12)
The average action except j: a¯−j = λ
(
N
n
N−1
∑
k 6=i
zk +
N
n
−1
N−1 zi
)
+ (1− λ) x¯
The expected utility function for subject j that belongs to a group i (We assume x¯→ θ):
E
(
Uj
(
aij , θ
))
= E
[
− (1− r) (aj − θ)
2
− r (aj − a¯−j)
2
]
E
(
Uj
(
aij, θ
))
= E

− (1 − r) (λ (θ + η) + (1 − λ) (θ + ε) − θ)2 + −r

λ (θ + η) + (1 − λ) (θ + ε) − λ


N
n
N−1
∑
k 6=i
(
θ + ηk
)
+
N
n
−1
N−1
(
θ + ηi
)

 + (1 − λ) θ




E
(
Uj
(
aij , θ
))
=
[
− (1− r)λ2 − r
(
λ′2 + λ ∗2 (n− 1)
)]
σ2η − (1− λ)
2
σ2ε
Where λ′ = λ
N−N
n
N−1 and λ
∗ = λ
N
n
N−1
Note that when n = 1, we get the same expression of the expected utility function of MS-treatment.
3.4 Procedural considerations
The experiment was carried at the Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE-LSE) laboratory in
Lyon (France). The experiment was computerized using Z-tree software (Fishbacher, 2007). The 96 subjects
who participated in this experiment were split into 12 groups (M=12). Three sessions were devoted to each
treatment, producing a total of six independent observations per treatment. Most of the subjects were students.
Sessions lasted about one hour, and subjects ‘average earnings were about 12€. In each period, subjects have
to make a decision on the true state given the signals. For the action choice, subjects were paid according to
the payoff function in (7), which was exchanged to the rate of 1000 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit)=1€.
Instructions, given in detail in the appendices, were distributed in a written form to subjects and were read
out loud before the beginning of each session. It was made sure that these instructions were well understood.
Subjects were asked to raise their hands if they had any questions, and answers were given privately by the
experimenter7.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Some descriptive statistics
First of all, we derive the theoretical predictions relative to the weights attached to the public and semi-public
information. The column Eij (θ) of Table 4 corresponds to the weight assigned to the public or the semi-
public (either partially disclosed or fragmented) according to the best linear expectation of the true state. The
7We allowed subjects to move a cursor only inside the interval defined by the signals to determine the action. This fact restrains
subjects from choosing actions outside of their signal interval.
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corresponding weights in MS and T stages are given by the following formula: ε
ε+η . In CH-stages, the weight
becomes P ε
ε+η . λ shows the equilibrium weight in the rational behavior for subjects who get the public or the
semi-public information, and λ¯ shows the optimal equilibrium over all subjects.
We begin by conducting some descriptive analyses that explore the weight assigned to the public (or semi-
public) signal by the subjects in the experiment depending on the treatment. In order to calculate the weights,
we proceed as follows: For each treatment and for each group, we caculate the weight on public information
using this formula8:
wj,t =
|aj,t − xj,t|
|yj,t − xj,t|
where j = 1, 2, ....8 and t = 1, 2, ..., 15
Table 4: Theoretical predictions
Stages r εij ηi P n E
i
j (θ) λ λ¯
Groups 1-6
1- MS 0.75 10 10 1 0.5 0.8 0.8
2- T1 0.75 10 10 2 0.5 0.5957 0.5957
3- T2 0.75 10 10 4 0.5 0.5283 0.5283
Groups 7-12
1- MS 0.75 10 10 1(8) 0.5 0.8 0.8
2- CH1 0.75 10 10 0.50 (4) 0.25 0.5957 0.2978
3- CH2 0.75 10 10 0.25 (2) 0.125 0.5283 0.1321
The final observed weights are averaged over subjects and over periods: w¯ = 115
1
8
∑15
t=1
∑8
j=1 wj,t . Descrip-
tive statistics shown in Table 5 provide some initial evidence that subjects tend to overreact -though not so
strong- to public signal, especially in MS-treatment. The weights decrease in partial transparent treatments as
predicted in theory.
Table 5: Observed and theoretical average weight on the public/semi public signal
(a) Observed and theoretical average weight on the public/semi public
signal for groups 1-6
Session Group MS T1 T2
1 1 0.570608378 0.547902395 0.469587499
1 2 0.60279939 0.511131085 0.555996466
2 3 0.561053942 0.554082587 0.507770622
2 4 0.57195844 0.652339574 0.537511011
3 5 0.535828025 0.583791449 0.529230798
3 6 0.612962297 0.552269316 0.493752244
Average group 0.575868412 0.566919401 0.51564144
Theoretical weight 0.8 0.5957 0.5283
(b) Observed and theoretical average weight on the public/semi public signal for groups 7-12
Session Group MS CH1inf CH1 CH2inf CH2
4 7 0.522276562 0.48319534 0.240936224 0.460659283 0.117219109
4 8 0.514370821 0.49636507 0.248182535 0.525562698 0.132572743
5 9 0.611633298 0.491836658 0.249750691 0.492093677 0.124004759
5 10 0.533378693 0.489211049 0.244605524 0.478262819 0.119565705
6 11 0.49185319 0.540945281 0.274704153 0.512655031 0.128163758
6 12 0.489843976 0.488669775 0.237979233 0.456122975 0.109818575
Average group 0.52722609 0.498370529 0.249359727 0.487559414 0.121890775
Theoretical weight 0.8 0.5957 0.29787234 0.5283 0.132075472
8We followed Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013).
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The weight assigned to the public (or semi-public) signal is significantly lower than the theoretical value in
MS-treatment for all groups 1-12 with a p-value=0.0277. In T-treatments, the hypothesis cannot be rejected
(p-values=0.2489 for T1 and 0.4631 for T2)). While rejection is found for groups 7-12 in CH-treatments with
the corresponding p-values=0.0277 and 0.0464. The average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal
as well as its variance which are aggregated this time by period are also reported in Figure 1 and Figure 3,
respectively. We see clearly that average observed weights are close to the theoretical values in the case of T1,
T2, while this is not the case for MS, CH1 and CH2 stages, resp. A visual inspection of Figure 2, which plots
the average weight assigned by each group in each treatment in each of the 15 periods, shows a much larger
weight in MS-treatment compared to CH-treatments, while the weights in MS, T1 and T2 are close to each one.
(a) Average weight assigned to public/semi-public signal for
Treatment A (1-6)
(b) Average weight assigned to public/semi-public signal for Treat-
ment B (7-12)
Figure 1: Average weight assigned to public/semi-public signal for Treatment A and B, th: refers to “theoretical”
(a) Average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal for
groups 1-6
(b) Average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal for
groups 7-12
Figure 2: Average weight assigned to the public/semi-public signal for groups 1-12
We can state our first result as follows:
Result 1.
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• In MS-treatment (1-12): the weight assigned to the public signal is significantly lower than its theoretical
value.
• In T-treatments (1-6): the weight that subjects in the experiment attach to the semi-public signal is not
significantly different from theoretical values.
• In CH-treatments (7-12): the weight is significantly lower than the theoretical value.
• In CH-informed (7-12), the weight is significantly lower than the theoretical value.
(a) Average variance of weights on public/semi-public signal for
Treatment A
(b) Average variance of weights on public/semi-public signal for
Treatment B
Figure 3: Average variance of weights on public/semi-public signal for Treatments A and B
The realized along with the theoretical average payoff are reported in the last lines of Table 6 (aggregated
by group) and on the Figures 4 and 5 (aggregated by period and by group, respectively).
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Table 6: Observed and theoretical payoff for groups 1-12
(a) Observed and theoretical average payoff for groups 1-6
Session Group MS T1 T2
1 1 276.813532 236.7903507 222.8636113
1 2 275.296778 207.024131 219.3019022
2 3 293.37568 213.57185 191.644543
2 4 284.8567 237.768111 243.785683
3 5 282.743724 199.367896 216.131322
3 6 284.014721 199.4099 201.445044
Average group 282.8501892 215.6553731 215.8620176
Theoretical payoff 333.3333333 258.0051305 234.2233298
(b) Observed and theoretical average payoff for groups 7-12
Session Group MS CH1 CH1inf CH2 CH2inf
4 7 188.419453 212.99358 261.335785 166.242015 183.859628
4 8 201.679532 209.168734 272.13497 167.421375 210.447564
5 9 209.929538 215.818793 27171487 163.868895 230.68721
5 10 191.498937 199.235248 232.905324 186.449527 247.098987
6 11 241.724278 196.297724 251.040025 182.696148 228.5519903
6 12 233.105939 218.758784 285.022702 153.648478 228.4519133
Average group 211.0596128 208.07121438 262.358946 170,.0544063 221.5162154
Theoretical payoff 333.3333333 165.9574468 286.9775162 111.5917092 254.1196946
Recall that in order to caculate the theoretical payoff , we need to replace each parameter by its value in the
expected utility expression corresponding to each case (MS, T and CH) according to Table 3 and then multiplied
by 10, the payoffs are significantly lower than their corresponding theoretical values in most of the treatments.
(a) Average payoff for Treatment A (b) Average payoff for Treatment B
Figure 4: Average payoff for Treatments A and B
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(a) Average payoff for groups 1-6 (b) Average payoff for groups 7-12
Figure 5: Average payoff for groups 1-12
4.2 Overreaction issue: comparison between theoretical predictions and experi-
mental results
The hypothesis to be tested in this case is: H0 : the observed weight on the public (resp. semi-public) information
by a group M in treatment G is not different from the theoretical weight in Ej (θ).
We perform for this purpose a non-parametric test: Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test, which is very
useful when we would like to compare observed values with fixed ones (cf. Table 7).
We find that the weight assigned in MS-treatment is significantly larger than its face value for all groups 1-12.
The p-value is overwemingly below the 5% significance level. But the same result doesn’t hold if we consider
seperate groups. For groups 7-12, the hypothesis cannot be rejected anymore.
We can state the second result:
Result 2. For all groups, the weight assigned to public signal is larger than the one attributed in the first order
expectation. Subjects do overreact to the common signal. Subjects still overreact to the semi-public information
in T1-treatment. But overreaction is efficiently reduced in T2-treatment and also in CH-treatments9.
Table 7: Overreaction test results
MS (1-6) MS (1-12) T1 (1-6) T2 (1-6)
Reject (p-value=0.0277
Reject (p-value=0.0047)
Reject (p-value=0.0277) Accept (p-value=0.2489)
MS (7-12) CH1 (7-12) CH2 (7-12)
Accept (p-value=0.1157) Accept (p-value=0.3454) Accept (p-value=0.3454)
4.3 Comparison between treatments
It is an evidence that CH-treatments differ from MS-treatments by a simple analytical comparison between
respective observed weights. However, we should compare between MS and CH1inf (inf refers to “informed”
subjects who receive the public signal) and CH2inf, respectively. Let us start with the statistical test conducted
for groups the 1-6 only (cf. Table 8). The hypothesis to be tested is: H0 : the observed weight on the public
(resp. semi-public) information by a group M in treatment G1 is not different from the weight in treatment G2
We conduct similarly a non-parametric test: Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test which results in an
insignificant difference between MS-treatment and T1-treatments while we can reject the same hypothesis when
we compare MS-treatment with T2-treatment (p-value=0.0277). And finally, we reject equality between T1-
treatment and T2-treatment with a p-value=0.0464, which seems to be a logical result. This finding corroborates
9The last finding doesn’t coincide with the observations of Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013).
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our previous results, that is the reduction of overreaction was efficient in that last phase of the experiment for
subjects of groups 1-6. Finally, there are no significant differences between weights assigned in MS, CH1inf and
CH2inf.
Result 3.
• The weights assigned in the MS-treatment and T1-treatment, respectively, are significantly larger than in
T2-treatment.
• The reduction of overreaction is more efficient when the fragmentation measure n is sufficienlty high.
• The difference between weights assigned in the MS-treatment, CH1inf-treatment and CH2inf is insignifcant.
Table 8: Comparison between treatments results
(a) Comparison between MS and T1 and T2 stages
MS T1 T2
MS X Accept (p-value=0.6002) Reject (p-value=0.0277)
T1 Accept (p-value=0.6002) X Reject (p-value=0.0464)
T2 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Reject (p-value=0.0464) X
(b) Comparison between MS and CH1inf and CH2inf stages
MS CH1inf CH2inf
MS X Accept (p-value=0.2489) Accept (p-value=0.1159)
CH1inf Accept (p-value=0.2489) X Accept (p-value=0.3454)
CH2inf Accept (p-value=0.1159) Accept (p-value=0.3454) X
4.4 Predictive power of K-level reasoning
In k-level thinking models, players have different levels of strategic sophistication, hence behave heterogeneously.
When a subject doesn’t choose an equilibrium action, this means that he follows a limited level of thinking.
The models of limited depth of reasoning are introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1994) and Nagel (1995) and are
successful at accounting for systematic deviation from equilibrium behavior.
Within the setting introduced in section 2, we derive actions that correspond to different levels of reasoning.
Player j chooses aj to maximize (1) (The utility function) and from the first order condition, the best response
is:
aj = (1− r)Ej (θ) + rEj (a¯−j)
We define level 0 in which agent is non strategic and randomly choose a number between two signals. Level
1 (L1) player expects that other players are L0 players. It means that L1 player believes that average action of
other players will be equal to their own estimated state, and so on...In this section, we propose to derive weights
put on public, and semi-public information.
4.4.1 Private and public information: The case of Morris and Shin (2002)
Suppose that all players except player j atttach weight τk
10to the public signal. The best response of player j
to such behavior is :
aj (k + 1) = (1− r)Ej (θ) + rEj (a¯−j)
10τ0 corresponds to the weight given by the first order-expectation in Ej (θ)
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aj (k + 1) = (1− r)Ej (θ) + +r [τky + (1− τk)Ej (θ)]
We replace Ej (θ) by its expression (
ε
ε+ηy +
η
ε+ηxj) and rearranging terms, we get:
aj (k + 1) =
[
(1− rτk)
ε
ε+ η
+ rτk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
τk+1
y +
[
(1− rτk)
η
ε+ η
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−τk+1
xj
By replacing ε, η, and r by their fixed values in the experiment, we get the following weights for the level of
reasoning:
Treatment A/B Stage 1
τ0 0.5
τ1 0.6875
τ2 0.7578
τ3 0.7842
τ∞ 0.8
4.4.2 Private and P-common beliefs: The case of Cornand and Heinemann (2008)
For subjects who only receive the private signal, they have no choice but playing aj = xj .
For subjects who receive both signals:
aj (k + 1) = (1− r)Ej (θ) + rEj (a¯−j)
aj (k + 1) = (1− r)Ej (θ) + +r
[
m− 1
N − 1
(τky + (1− τk)Ej (θ)) +
N −m
N − 1
Ej (θ)
]
We replace Ej (θ) by its expression (
ε
ε+ηy +
η
ε+ηxj) and rearranging terms, we get:
aj (k + 1) =
(N − 1) ε+ (m− 1) rτkη
(N − 1) (ε+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸ y
τk+1
+
(N − 1− (m− 1) τk) η
(N − 1) (ε+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−τk+1
xj
Averaging over all agents,
a¯j (k + 1) =
m((N − 1) ε+ (m− 1) rτkη)
N (N − 1) (ε+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸ y
τ¯k+1
+
(N −m) +m((N − 1)− (m− 1) τk)η
N (N − 1) (ε+ η)︸ ︷︷ ︸ x¯
1−τ¯k+1
By replacing N,m, ε, η, and r by their fixed values in the experiment, we get the following weights for the
level of reasoning:
Treatment B Stage 2 Stage 3
τ0 0.25 0.125
τ1 0.2901 0.1316
τ2 0.2966 0.1320
τ3 0.2976 0.1321
τ∞ 0.2978 0.1321
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4.4.3 Private and semi-public information: The case of Trabelsi (2012)
All players (except j) attach weight τk to the semi-public signal. The best response will be :
aij (k + 1) = (1− r)E
i
j (θ) + rE
i
j (a¯−j)
aij (k + 1) = (1− r)E
i
j (θ) + r
[
τk
(
N − N
n
N − 1
Eij (θ) +
N
n
− 1
N − 1
zi
)
+ (1− τk)E
i
j (θ)
]
We replace Eij (θ) by its expression (
ε
ε+ηi
zi +
η
ε+ηi
xij) and rearranging terms, we get:
aij (k + 1) =
rτk
(
N
n
− 1
)
ηi+ε(N−1)
(N − 1) (ε+ ηi)︸ ︷︷ ︸ zi
τk
+
(
1− rτk
N
n
− 1
N − 1
)
ε
ε+ ηi︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−τk+1
xij
By replacing N,n, ε, ηi, and r by their fixed values in the experiment, we get the following weights for the
level of reasoning:
Treatment A Stage 2 Stage 3
τ0 0.5 0.5
τ1 0.5803 0.5267
τ2 0.5932 0.5282
τ3 0.5953 0.5282
τ∞ 0.5957 0.5283
Table 9 provides a summary of the theoretical weights on public or semi-public according to different levels
of reasoning.
Table 9: Theoretical average weights on the public and semi-public signal according to levels of reasoning for
each treatment
Treatment MS T1 CH1 T2 CH2
Group 1-12 1-6 7-12 1-6 7-12
L0 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.125
L1 0.6875 0.5803 0.2901 0.5267 0.1316
L2 0.7578 0.5932 0.2966 0.5282 0.1320
L3 0.7842 0.5953 0.2976 0.5282 0.1321
L4 0.7940 0.5956 0.2978 0.5283 0.1321
L5 0.7941 0.5957 0.2978 0.5283 0.1321
L6 0.7977 0.5957 0.2978 0.5283 0.1321
L∞(eq) 0.8 0.5957 0,2978 0.5283 0.1321
Observed weight 0.5515 0.5669 0.2493 0.5156 0.1218
As we have explained, players use simplified models in order to avoid the complexity of equilibrium. The
hypothesis to be tested is:
H0: The observed weight is not different from the value of the theoretical weight at level k.
Through Wilcoxon matched pair signed rank test, we can see that subjects don’t have high levels of reasoning
in MS-treatment (Table 10). On average, subjects’ weights are located between L0 and L1 (See Figure 6). The
hypothesis cannot be rejected for levels 1 and higher in the case of T1-treatment, while it’s rejected in CH-
treatments, where the weight is significantly lower for each level k ≥ 1. And the hypothesis is accepted for all
levels in the case of T2-treatment.
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Table 10: Tests results of the hypothesis: The observed weight is not different from the the value of the theoretical
weight at level k
(a) Results for groups 1-6
Treatment MS T1 T2
Group 1-6 1-6 1-6
L0 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Reject (p-value=0.0277) Accept (p-value=0.2489)
L1 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Accept (p-value=0.4631) Accept (p-value=0.4631)
L2 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Accept (p-value=0.2486) Accept (p-value=0.4631)
L3 Reject (p-value=0.0277 Accept (p-value=0.2486) Accept (p-value=0.4631)
L4 Reject (p-value=0.0277 Accept (p-value=0.2486) Accept (p-value=0.4631)
L5 Reject (p-value=0.0277 Accept (p-value=0.2486) Accept (p-value=0.4631)
(b) Results for groups 7-12
Treatment MS CH1 CH2
Group 7-12 7-12 7-12
L0 Accept (p-value=0.1157) Accept p-value=0.3454) Accept (p-value=0.3454)
L1 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Reject p-value=0.0277) Reject (p-value=0.0431)
L2 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Reject p-value=0.0277) Reject (p-value=0.0431)
L3 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Reject p-value=0.0277) Reject (p-value=0.0431)
L4 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Reject p-value=0.0277) Reject (p-value=0.0431)
L5 Reject (p-value=0.0277) Reject p-value=0.0277) Reject (p-value=0.0431)
In order to strengthen our previous observations, we propose to complete with an individual analysis of
subjects’ behavior in the lines of Shapiro et al. (2010). We see that subjects operate different levels of reasoning
depending on the treatment. According to Table 11, the number of cases in which subjects operate the same
level of reasoning as in MS-treatment is higher in T2 than in T1-treatment (20 cases versus 16). This means that
players attach importance to “the de-coordination effect” induced by an increase in the fragmentation measure
(n = 4), this observation corraborates our result found in section 4.2, where the reduction of overreaction was
more efficient in T2-treatment.
(a) Frequency of players according to levels of reasoning for
groups 1-6
(b) Frequency of players according to levels of reasoning for
groups 7-12
Figure 6: Frequency of players according to different levels of reasoning
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Table 11: Individual behavior of subjects: Groups 1-6
Subjects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Session 1
MS L1 L1 L0 L0 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L1 L0 L0 L2 L0 L2
T1 L0 L1 L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L1 L0 L∞ L∞ L0 L0 L0 L1 L0 L1
T2 L∞ L1 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L0 L∞ L∞ L∞ L0 L0
Session 2
MS L∞ L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L2 L0 L0 L0 L2 L0 L0 L1 L1
T1 L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L∞ L∞ L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L∞ L∞ L0 L∞ L∞ L∞
T2 L0 L0 L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L0 L∞ L∞ L0 L∞ L0 L∞ L0 L1 L∞
Session 3
MS L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L1 L0 L0 L1 L0 L0 L1 L∞ L0 L1 L1
T1 L∞ L0 L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L∞ L0 L∞ L0 L0 L0
T2 L0 L∞ L∞ L0 L∞ L1 L∞ L0 L1 L∞ L0 L0 L0 L0 L∞ L0
Compared to the case of the first experiment (Where we established a fragmented information), in the second
experiment, most of the subjects don’t seem to follow a level of thinking (cf. Table 12). Generally, subjects’
weights are located between L0 and L1. Their actions, however, approach equilibrium in the last phase of the
game. The number of cases in which players opperate the same level of reasoning as in MS-treatment is higher
in CH1-treatment than in CH2-treatment (26 versus 20 cases). 42 subjects out of 48 operate the same level
of reasoning in two or more treatments. As the game is complicated from structural point of view, L1 are not
optimally responding to L0, whose behaviors are ambiguous. Hence, it is not possible for L1 to develop optimal
strategies.
Overall, in both games, this result is in accordance with that of Nagel (1995) who finds that subjects tend
to adhere to the same level of thinking throughout the study in a pure beauty contest game11. The theory of
K-level show that limited levels of thinking necessarily lead subjects to underweight the public signal compared
to equilibrium predictions where players suppose to place much weight on the public signal (cf. Kübler and
Weizsäcker, 2004).
Table 12: Individual behavior of subjects: Groups 7-12
Subjects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Session 4
MS L1 L0 L1 L1 L0 L0 L0 L1 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L1 L0
CH1 L0 L0 L0 L1 L0 L0 L1 L∞ L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0
CH2 L0 L0 L∞ L∞ L∞ L0 L0 L∞ L0 L∞ L0 L∞ L∞ L∞ L∞ L∞
Session 5
MS L0 L1 L1 L0 L1 L1 L1 L1 L1 L1 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L1
CH1 L1 L∞ L0 L0 L0 L0 L1 L0 L0 L1 L0 L∞ L0 L0 L0 L0
CH2 L∞ L1 L0 L0 L∞ L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L1 L∞ L0
Session 6
MS L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0
CH1 L0 L0 L1 L1 L∞ L1 L1 L1 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L0 L1
CH2 L0 L∞ L∞ L0 L0 L0 L∞ L0 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L0 L0 L0
Finally, we sum up the main results of this paper in comparing experimental evidence to theoretical predic-
tions in terms of informational disclosure policy (see Table 13).
The study of Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013) didn’t permit to choose whether the central bank shall decrease
the precision of the information (partial publicity) or disclose the information to only a fraction of the economic
agents. Neverthless, while the precision of public information doesn’t seem to have an impact on subjects’
behavior, the above authors recommend a communication strategy that is based on varying the precision of the
central bank’s information rather than disclosing the same information to a limited audience.
11Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013) found a similar observation. Note that those authors use the notation L1 and L2 which correspond
to L0 and L1 in our case.
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Table 13: Theoretical versus experimental observations
Basic framework Theoretical predictions Experimental re-
sults (Cornand and
Baeriswyl, 2013)
Experimental results (Ours)
one public signal + one
private signal (Morris
and Shin)
The public signal serves
as a focal point. It leads
to an overreaction prob-
lem by the agents.
Overreaction is de-
tected but not as
strong as the theory
predicts.
Overreaction is ob-
served and detected but
not as strong as the
theory predicts.
one public signal to
a proprtion P of the
agents + one private
signal (Cornand and
Heinemann (2008)
A more precise public
information disclosed to
a proportion P of the
agents.
→ overreaction is re-
duced and welfare is en-
hanced.
Overreaction is persis-
tent even in the case
of establishing partial
communication strate-
gies.
There are differences
between weights in
partial publicity and
partial transparency
treatments, resp.
Agents’ behavior is
not sensitive to vary-
ing the precision of
public information.
Overreaction is eff-
ciently reduced.
n semi-public signal +
one private signal (Tra-
belsi, 2012)
The semi-public signal
serves as a focal point to
agents belonging to the
same group. As it differ
from a group to another,
agents will no more ig-
nore their proper signal.
None Overreaction is reduced
more efficiently when
the fragmentation mea-
sure is high.
Our main economic conclusion of our exprimental study is that by either establishing a partial publicity or
a fragmented information, the central bank could alleviate overreaction that was meant to lead to a harmful
effect to social welfare. From a practical point of view and given the previous results of the study of Cornand
and Baeriswyl (2013), fragmentation would be more feasible to be implemented than a partial publicity given
the widespread of the media.
Both experimental studies offer ways for central bankers to think strategically about solutions that focus on
the best practices and adding values. A recent incident of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) can illustrate markets’
overreaction (published in LeTemps.ch). In fact, statements of SNB concerning equities have generated a loss of
more than two billion swiss franc of market capitalization, giving suspicion of insider trading. This fact incited
SNB to review its communication policy .
5 Concluding remarks
The goal of this paper is to discuss the efficiency of two different partial transparency strategies, by making them
comparable to a policy where the central bank’s private information is fully available to all agents (subjects).
To do that, we generalize the classical beauty contest setting by using the models of Cornand and Heinemann
(2008) and Trabelsi (2012), respectively, that are initially derived from the canonical framework of Morris and
Shin (2002). Having the experimental design based on Morris and Shin model generates an environment that is
more complex than the one used in theory. All payoff function and optimal decision action were re-designed in
order to fit the reality, where the number of subjects is finite. The paper provides support both for and against
global game’s theoretical approach as well as the models of K-level thinking. We conjecture that the reason of
these results is that our informational structure involves a private information and that the coordination motive
is not sufficiently high. Moreover, as observed behavior is not sensitive to the details of information structure,
18
the precision of information should not be taken into account in future research (Through comparative statistics,
Cornand and Baeriswyl (2013) didn’t find any significance of the effect of the relative precision of public and
private signals on subjects’ behavior. This is a supplementary justification that we didn’t vary the precision of
information in our experiment.), but rather we should study the effect of information and other payoff relevant
parameters on strategic uncertainty.
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A General instructions (Translated from French to English)
Thanks for participating to an economic experiment. You cannot communicate with other participants. You
belong to a group of 8 players. This session consists of 3 stages, each one lasts for 15 periods. Your main task
is to try to guess the value of the true state V. All what you have to do is to submit a number. Returns will be
determined by the following two factors:
• The true state V (unknown)
• The average decision made by the other players of your group
At the time when you make your decisions, you will not know either of these two factors. You will need to decide
based on the information that will be made available to you.
Your profit and cash payments
Your profit will be calculated as follows. In the beginning of each round you will be given 400 ECU. From
this amount, we will deduct points when your action does not match the true state. We will also deduct points
when your action does not match the average decisions made by others. Your final profit will be calculated
according to the following formula:
Payoff=400− 2.5× (your decision− V )
2
− 7.5× (your decision− average decision of others)
2
The first term says that your action will bring you at most 400 ECU. The second term determines your loss
from mismatching the true state. The third term determines your loss from mismatching the average decisions
made by others. In the case of negative payoff, the computer screen will report a zero gain. You find below
some examples:
V 50 409 100 256
Private
signal
41 408 101 249
Public signal 46 415 108 257
Your deci-
sion
44.2 410.5 107.5 250
Average deci-
sion of others
45 413.2 104.5 263
profit/gain
in Units
365.72 390.46 334.75 195
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The profit that you made in each period will be converted into cash by the following procedure: The session
lasts for 45 periods. Your cash earnings will be equal to the total profit that you earned during these 45 periods:
1000 units are converted into 1 Euro.
A.1 Instructions relative to stage 1 of sessions 1,2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 (MS)
For each of the 15 periods, a value of the true state V is randomly drawn from a certain interval. You will not
know the value of V.
Guessing the true state
In the beginning of each period, you and all other participants in your session will receive two signals that
will provide you with information about the true state:
- A common signal (public information) randomly drawn from the interval [V-10, V+10]
- A private signal drawn from the interval [V-10, V+10], independently from the common signal. Here is
what you know and what you don’t know about the information available to other players in your group:
• They receive two signals, just like you do;
• You know the first signal that everyone receives. It is common. All players in your session will have the
same signal.
• You do not know the second signal that they receive. The second signal is a private signal. It means that
you cannot see private signals received by other players. It also means that they cannot see the private
signal that you receive.
A.2 Instructions relative to stage 2 of sessions 1,2, and 3 (T1)
For each of the 15 periods, a value of the true state V is randomly drawn from a certain interval. You will not
know the value of V. The rules are similar to the stage 1, except the subjects will be divided into 2 sub-groups:
• Sub-group 1 contains 4 participants
• Sub-group 2 contains 4 participants
Guessing the true state
• If you belong to the sub-group 1, you and 3 other participants will receive 2 signals;
1. a common signal to 4 participants randomly drawn from [V-10, V+10]
2. a private signal randomly drawn from [V-10, V+10], independently from the first signal
• If you belong to the sub-group 1, you and 3 other participants will receive 2 signals;
1. a common signal to 4 participants randomly drawn from [V-10, V+10]
2. a private signal randomly drawn from [V-10, V+10], independently from the first signal
You choose then a value of V between both signals you receive.
Your profit depends on the deviation from the true state as well as the deviation from the average decision
of your 7 opponents.
The number of players in each sub-group is the same during all periods. The players are randomly matched
during the first period, then the matching remains stable during the rest of the 14 periods.
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A.3 Instructions relative to stage 3 of sessions 1,2, and 3 (T2)
For each of the 15 periods, a value of the true state V is randomly drawn from a certain interval. You will not
know the value of V. The rules are similar to the stage 1, except the subjects will be divided into 4 sub-groups:
• Sub-group 1 contains 2 participants
• Sub-group 2 contains 2 participants
• Sub-group 3 contains 2 participants
• Sub-group 4 contains 2 participants
Guessing the true state
Whatever the sub-group to which you belong, you and 1 other participant will receive 2 signals;
1. a common signal to 2 participants randomly drawn from [V-10, V+10]
2. a private signal randomly drawn from [V-10, V+10], independently from the first signal
You choose then a value of V between both signals you receive.
Your profit depends on the deviation from the true state as well as the deviation from the average decision
of your 7 opponents.
The number of players in each sub-group is the same during all periods. The players are randomly matched
during the first period, then the matching remains stable during the rest of the 14 periods.
A.4 Instructions relative to stage 2 of sessions 4,5, and 6 (CH1)
For each of the 15 periods, a value of the true state V is randomly drawn from a certain interval. You will not
know the value of V. The rules are similar to the stage 1, except the subjects will be divided into 2 sub-groups:
• Sub-group 1 contains 4 participants
• Sub-group 2 contains 4 participants
Guessing the true state
• If you belong to the sub-group 1, you will receive 2 signals; a common signal and a private signal. You
decide then on the basis of these 2 signals.
You choose then a value of V between both signals you receive.
• If you belong to sub-group 2, you will only receive a private signal and then you have to decide according
to that specific signal.
Your profit depends on the deviation from the true state as well as the deviation from the average decision of
your 7 opponents.
The number of players in each sub-group is the same during all periods. The players are randomly matched
during the first period, then the matching remains stable during the rest of the 14 periods.
A.5 Instructions relative to stage 3 of sessions 4,5, and 6 (CH2)
For each of the 15 periods, a value of the true state V is randomly drawn from a certain interval. You will not
know the value of V. The rules are similar to the stage 1, except the subjects will be divided into 2 sub-groups:
• Sub-group 1 contains 2 participants
• Sub-group 2 contains 6 participants
Guessing the true state
You receive two signals:
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• If you belong to the sub-group 1, you will receive 2 signals; a common signal and a private signal. You
decide then on the basis of these 2 signals.
You choose then a value of V between both signals you receive.
• If you belong to sub-group 2, you will only receive a private signal and then you have to decide according
to that specific signal.
Your profit depends on the deviation from the true state as well as the deviation from the average decision of
your 7 opponents.
The number of players in each sub-group is the same during all periods. The players are randomly matched
during the first period, then the matching remains stable during the rest of the 14 periods.
B Questionnaire
B.1 Training questions (starting sessions 1 to 3) T1 & T2
Q1 In stage 1, you receive 2 signals: Common signal=145.7, private signal=138, then the true
state is :
• between 135.7 and 148
• between 138 and 145.7
• between 148 and 155.7
Q2 In stage 2, you receive 2 signals: Common signal=352.4, private signal=344.2, then the true
state is:
• between 344.2 and 352.4
• between 342.4 and 354.2
• between 350.4 and 354.2
Q3 Fill in the blanks: At stage 2, the 8 players will be divided into . . . sub-groups, the sub-group 1
contains. . . players. In each period, the players who belong to the sub-group1 receive . . . common signal and
. . . .private signal. The players who belong to the sub-group1 receive . . . common signal and . . . .private signal.
Q4 Profit formula
1. The true state equals to 256, your decision= 249, and the average decision of your opponents is 240, write
the formulae of your gain:
2. To maximize your profit, it is more important your decision be close to the unknown true state than to
the decision of the other players? Yes No
B.2 Training questions (starting sessions 4 to 6) CH1 & CH2
Q1 In stage 1, you receive 2 signals: Common signal=145.7, private signal=138, then the true
state is :
• between 135.7 and 148
• between 138 and 145.7
• between 148 and 155.7
Q2 In stage 2, you only receive a private signal=127, then your decision will be: .....
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Q3 Profit formula
1. The true state equals to 256, your decision= 249, and the average decision of your opponents is 240, write
the formula of your gain:
2. To maximize your profit, it is more important your decision be close to the unknown true state than to
the decision of the other players? Yes No
C Examples of screen layout
Screen n°1: Decision phase
Screen n°2: Information phase
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D Parameters values in the expected utility function
Table 14: Parameters values in the expected utility function
MS T1 T2 MS CH1 CH2
λ 0.8 0.5957 0.5283 λ 0.8 0.5957 0.5283
λ
′
0.3404 0.4528 λˆ 0.2553 0.088
λ∗ 0.3404 0.1509 λ˜ 0.3404 0.1509
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